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1. Introduction
Due to population aging, there is a worldwide growing concern with the sustainability
of public (and private) pension system(s). Indexing the normal retirement age (NRA)
to the life expectancy seems to be a powerful tool to mitigate the stress but this should
be completed with the so-called actuarially fair benefit–retirement age schedule. For
decades, there have been various versions of actuarially fair (or neutral) schedules in use,
steeply increasing the benefits for any additional year above the minimal retirement age.
The last decade has witnessed the spread of a theoretically simple and elegant scheme,
called NDC. At the same time, using mechanism design, a number of theoretical papers
have shown that adverse selection (workers retiring later also die later) may call for
dampened schedules.
The present paper presents a novel Hungarian data set revealing strong adverse
selection and discusses the pros and cons of NDC in a theoretical model. Our new
set-up forsakes the mechanism design approach to allow for more realistic demographic
and wage structures.
NDC is an acronym for nonfinancial (or earlier: notional) defined contribution and
it refers to pension systems, where an unfunded system mimics a funded one without
suffering from the costly transition period. The basic idea of the NDC scheme is to pay
a special life annuity: the annual pension benefit is calculated as the ratio of the stock of
accumulated nonfinancial contributions and the remaining life expectancy. This allows
for variable (flexible) retirement age: those, who want to retire before/after reaching the
NRA, receive a properly reduced/increased annual benefit. The schedule is independent
of the wage and for any given retirement age, the benefit is proportional to the wage.1 If
workers only differed in their labor disutilities or in the dates of claiming their benefits
(not modeled here), then the NDC scheme would provide perfect incentives, maximize
social welfare and ensure the balance between revenues and expenditures (Holzmann
and Palmer, 2006 and Holzmann, Palmer and Robalino, 2012).2
In a paradoxical way, the importance of wage heterogeneity has been stressed at the
evaluation of progressive public pension systems. Their critics (e.g. World Bank, 1994, p.
131) and their defenders (e.g. Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001) equally emphasize that “there
[is] little [lifetime] redistribution from the rich to the poor, despite progressive benefit
formulas,... because [they are] earnings-related ... [and]... upper-income people enter
the labor force later in life and live longer after retirement.” To see the independence
of proportionality (between lifetime contributions and annual benefits) and neutrality,
note that in a group of countries (e.g. Germany), proportionality and weak actuarial
adjustment coexist, while in another group of countries (e.g. the US), progressivity and
strong actuarial adjustment coexist.
Evidently, under tight link between lifetime contributions and annual benefits, there
is a hidden regressive lifetime redistribution from the poorer to the richer (e.g. Breyer
and Hupfeld, 2009). Kre´mer (2012) observed that the rather unequal distribution of
the Hungarian entry pensions becomes rather equal in the distribution of all pensions
1 For simplicity, we neglect the age dependence of wages.
2 The impact of delayed claiming social security benefits was analyzed theoretically as well as
empirically by Coile, Diamond, Gruber and Jousten (2002).
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partly because pensioners with low benefits die much earlier than the others.3
The designers of the NDC scheme have minimized intercohort redistribution of NDC
by choosing an appropriate fictitious interest rate and adding a balancing mechanism to
counter the impact of rising life expectancy and sinking fertility (for a fresh analysis, see
Knell (2012)). They claimed that the NDC eliminates any intracohort redistribution.4
Following Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) on disability retirement, another group of
analysts have criticized the excessive intracohort redistribution in the NDC scheme,
or more generally, in actuarial fair adjustment in old-age pensions: Fabel (1994), Eso˝
and Simonovits (2002), Diamond (2003, Chapter 7), Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau
(2004), Simonovits (2006), Sheshinski (2008), Bommier, Leroux and Lozachmeur (2011)
and Eso˝, Simonovits and To´th (2011).
For technical reasons, modeling the socially optimal design, most of the above-
mentioned critical writings assumed common earnings. Furthermore, our earlier pa-
pers used a primitive schedule, excluding the possibility that the shortest-lived type
dies before the longest-lived one retires. Among authors allowing for that complication,
Diamond (2003) restricted his analysis to the choice between minimal and maximal
retirement ages, while Sheshinski (2008) discussed learning the survival curve. Further-
more, there were very few data to substantiate our theoretical findings. The proponents
of the NDC scheme, however, have hardly noticed lest accepted this type of critique on
NDC’s excessive intracohort redistribution. In this paper, our earlier critique of NDC
is revisited and extended to other pension systems. There seems to be a hope that the
present pedestrian approach may catch their attention.
The contributions of the present paper are as follows. First, nationwide Hungarian
data are presented on all those old-age pensioners who deceased in 2004 (unpublished
work of Judit Marosi and Rudolf Borlo´i). Even though there were only very weak
incentives to postpone retirement and quite strong incentives to early retirement, there
was a very strong adverse selection in the period ending in 2004, the year when the
citizens in our sample died. To give just one data on adverse selection: males aged 65
had a remaining life expectancy 13.1 years, while those who retired at age 65 lived on
average a surprisingly long period of 24.3 years. Second, giving up the mathematically
sophisticated mechanism design approach, and incorporating Banya´r (2011)’s critique
on our earlier formulation, now the original primitive NDC schedule is replaced by a
realistic one.5 Under plausible assumptions, unless the benefits uniformly scaled down,
the NDC scheme remains still unbalanced, i.e. the average revenues are much lower
than the average expenditures are. Furthermore, the lifetime balances keep decreasing
with life expectancies.
Third, to prove the inevitability of regressive intracohort redistribution, we have
introduced the category of regular benefit–retirement age schedules. Delaying the formal
definition of this category we rest satisfied with the following outline: (i) an increase
of one year in life expectancy raises the retirement age less than one year (a weakening
3 The other part of this discrepancy is caused by the slow phasing-out of earlier granted progressive
benefits.
4 Note that in the model country for NDC, Sweden, the proportional NDC is modified by a pension
credit system, at least after the pensioner’s age overtakes the NRA.
5 I do not follow him, however, in his transformation of the NDC scheme into a minimum flat
scheme.
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of A1*) and (ii) the difference ratio of benefit to contribution is at least as high the
ratio of working period to the retirement period (A5). Artificial numerical examples
illustrate the analytical theorems. For example, using a 30 percent contribution rate,
and eliminating an aggregate deficit about 2.5-year total wage, our balanced NDC scheme
punishes the shortest lived (who died at 63) and lowest paid by 5.1-year own wage. On
the other hand, the longest lived (who died at 93) and highest paid is rewarded by
9-year own wage. In the compressed NDC scheme, the lifetime balances are still large
in absolute values and remain decreasing with the life expectancies but much more
compressed, starting from 2.6-year surplus and ending with 3.8-year deficit.
It is to be underlined that in the present approach, the mortality rates are given
exogenously and are independent of the retirement age and the benefit. In reality,
however, the meaningful work lengthens the lifespan and the increased benefits make
room for better health care and longer lives.
The approach also neglects the very important gender differences, though in reality,
males earn much more and die much earlier than females do. Copying the practice of
public pensions, in our theoretical framework, we use a unisex framework, weakening
the positive correlation between lifetime earnings and life expectancies, prevailing for
males and females separately.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 displays the
Hungarian data on adverse selection. Section 3 analyzes the actuarial pitfalls of the
NDC system, while Section 4 proves the inevitability of some intracohort redistribution
for any regular scheme. Section 5 contains numerical illustrations on the balanced and
the compressed NDC systems and Section 6 concludes.
2. Hungarian data on adverse selection
We present Tables 1 and 2 to contrast the remaining life expectancies with the expected
pension spans as a function of retirement age of all Hungarian male and female old-
age pensioners who died in 2004. We shall see the adverse selection mentioned in the
Introduction. Rows with NRA (60 for males and 55 for females valid until 1996) are
italicized.6
Note that our statistical data are quite rudimentary: they do not distinguish between
survival profiles of subsequent cohorts, they neglect the changes in the rules of retirement
occurring in various years and are silent on the wage heterogeneity.
Let us look at these items one by one. Like in the usual period life expectancy, the
entering cohorts are replaced by outgoing cohorts. In Hungary, NRA for males increased
from 60 (until 1996) to 62 (since 2001), while this parameter value for females rose from
55 (until 1996) to 62 (since 2009). The calculation of the benefits have also changed
substantially, both of the full benefit and the reward for delayed retirement. The full
benefit was quite progressive until 1997 and since then progressivity has been quickly
phased out. There was no reward for delayed retirement until 1996, and practically
6 Dive´nyi and Ke´zdi (2012) provided evidence that the poor health status of the Hungarian popu-
lation above 50 years is one important cause of the low old-age employment and by implication, of low
but heterogeneous life expectancies.
3
no extra reward for working longer than 42 years. Since 1997, the reward has been
substantial and beyond 40 years of employment (with 80 percent net replacement),
every additional year increases the benefits by 2 percents of the net wage.
Table 1. Expected lifespan and retirement age, male, years, HU
Expected Remaining
Retirement Relative retirement Life life Estimation
age frequency span expectancy expectancy error
L+R 100ϕR DR −R L+DR MR SR
57 7.4% 12.3 69.3 18.0 –5.7
58 6.0% 13.5 71.5 17.3 –3.8
59 4.6% 14.2 73.2 16.7 –2.5
60 60.5% 17.2 73.2 16.1 1.1
61 12.7% 18.1 79.1 15.4 1.7
62 3.9% 20.9 79.1 14.9 6.0
63 2.1% 22.4 85.4 14.3 8.1
64 1.6% 23.4 85.4 13.7 9.7
65 1.4% 24.3 89.3 13.1 11.2
Remarks. L = 20, SR = DR −R−MR. Number of observations: 28.5 thousands.
Table 2. Expected lifespan and retirement age, female, years, HU
Expected Remaining
Retirement Relative retirement Life life Estimation
age frequency span expectancy expectancy error
L+R 100ϕR DR −R L+DR MR SR
52 2.3% 14.8 66.8 27.4 –12.6
53 2.0% 15.8 68.8 26.6 –10.8
54 2.3% 19.7 73.7 25.7 –6.0
55 46.2% 20.7 75.7 24.9 –4.2
56 16.8% 23.6 79.6 24.1 –0.5
57 7.9% 24.3 81.3 23.3 1.0
58 5.9% 24.7 82.7 22.5 2.2
59 4.0% 25.4 84.4 21.7 3.7
60 4.3% 26.7 86.7 20.9 5.8
61 2.6% 25.6 86.6 20.1 5.5
62 2.0% 24.5 86.5 19.3 5.2
63 1.7% 23.5 86.5 18.5 5.0
64 1.0% 23.0 87.0 17.7 5.3
65 1.0% 21.5 86.5 16.9 4.6
Remarks. L = 20, SR = DR −R−MR. Number of observations: 30.3 thousands.
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The weakest point of the empirical background is the lack of data on pensions (and
wages). If the main driver of intra-cohort redistribution is the well-known strong positive
correlation between incomes and life expectancies rather than that between retirement
ages and life expectancies, then the foregoing criticism is somewhat misplaced.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that this unique data set still correctly reflects the
adverse selection. We start the presentation with column 1, classifying the deceased
according to their retirement ages between 57 (52) and 65 for males (females). Column
2 contains the relative frequencies of these groups. Column 3 is the most interesting
one, depicting the expected retirement span as a function of the retirement age. Adding
up the columns 1 and 3 yields the life expectancy, displayed in column 4. In contrast
to males, females retiring above age 59 appear to differ only in their labor disutilities
but not in their life expectancies.7 Column 5 contains the usual remaining (average)
life expectancies, regardless of the retirement status. Column 6 displays the estimation
error of government, being the signed difference of columns 3 and 5. Note that for
males, the estimation error drops from 5.7 (at retirement age 57) to –11.2 years (at 65),
while for females, the change is from 12.6 (at age 52) to –4.6 years (at age 65).
3. A critique of the NDC scheme
Having presented the data, we work out the model to criticize the NDC scheme, com-
paring symmetric information and asymmetric information. For convenience, we neglect
childhood: L = 0, hence the type-specific adult retirement age and the length of em-
ployment are equal. We assume that the population is stationary, there is neither
inflation nor personal income taxation (for an exception, Cremer et al., 2004). We
also assume that the government knows the probability distribution of lifespans. Every
worker chooses his retirement age (i.e. when he stops working and claims the benefit)
depending on his life expectancy, consumption utilities and labor disutility. In harmony
with the practice of public pension systems, there is no sex discrimination.
Symmetric information
Following the proponents of the NDC system, we start our analysis with the assumption
of symmetric information: the government and the workers have the same stochastic
information on lifespans (more realistically, life expectancies). We shall see that in this
case, the NDC is indeed actuarially fair.
Let fD be the probability of death at age D, for D = α, . . . , ω;
∑ω
D=α fD = 1, α
being the earliest age what is relevant for old-age retirement, while ω is the maximal life
span. We define the remaining (average) life expectancy of aged a, where a is a positive
integer:
Ma =
∑ω
D=a+1 fD(D − a)∑ω
D=a+1 fD
, a = α, . . . , ω − 1. (1a)
We shall assume thatMa is decreasing but the decrease is limited: Ma > Ma+1 ≥Ma−1.
7 In this domain, NDC works perfectly.
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We shall need the intermediate values to be defined by linear interpolation. Let A
be a positive real number and a = [A] be its integer part, while {A} be its fractional
part, i.e. A = a+ {A}. Then the generalized remaining life expectancy is
M(A) = (1− {A})Ma + {A}Ma+1. (1b)
Note that M(A) is continuous and decreasing.
For simplicity, we assume that a worker earns a positive constant annual wage w
during his active lifetime and the government charges a contribution rate τ , where
0 < τ < 1. Thus a worker retiring at age R has accumulated a nonfinancial pension
wealth τRw, yielding an annual NDC benefit
bN (R) =
τRw
M(R)
. (2)
Note that delaying retirement by one year raises the numerator and decreases the de-
nominator, thus doubly raises the annual benefit.
Then, regardless of the value of the retirement age R, his expected lifetime (pension)
balance is zero:
zN (R) = τRw −M(R)bN (R) = 0. (3)
We can also consider the special symmetric case, when both the government and the
workers know the exact life expectancies. Then the full-information benefit rule
bF (R) =
τRw
D −R (4)
also leads to a zero lifetime balance:
zF (R) = τRw − (D −R)bF (R) = 0. (5)
It is remarkable that assuming common retirement age and using the full-information
rule, Breyer–Hupfeld (2009) also totally eliminated redistribution. This solution, how-
ever, totally neglects the adverse selection, therefore we do not follow it.
Asymmetric information
Facts presented in Tables 1 and 2, namely that DR was a steeply increasing rather
than an approximately constant sequence call for replacing assumption of symmetric
information by that of asymmetric information. Therefore we assume that only the
workers know exactly their own lifespans (or life expectancies) but the government only
knows the stochastic distribution.
We return from DR into RD and add notation of annual wage wD. Introducing the
government’s estimation error of pension span
SD = D −RD −M(RD),
the type-specific balance is
zND = τRD wD−(D−RD)
τRD wD
M(RD)
= (M(RD)−D+RD)bN (RD) = −SD bN (RD). (6)
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In words, the NDC-lifetime balance is the product of the negative of estimation error
and the corresponding benefit.
To obtain analytical results, we must make various assumptions. They are not always
elegant but are quite realistic, little restrictive and make the proofs easy to understand.
From now on we number our assumptions as A1, A2 etc.
We assume that the retirement age is a weakly increasing function of the life ex-
pectancy:
RD ≤ RD+1, D = α, α+ 1, . . . , ω − 1. (A1)
Additionally we also assume that the annual wage is a weakly increasing function of
the life expectancy:
wD ≤ wD+1, D = α, α+ 1, . . . , ω − 1. (A2)
A1–A2 are acceptable from a logical as well as an empirical point of view. A simple
consequence of A1–A2, M(RD) ≥ M(RD+1) and (2) is that the NDC-benefits are
weakly increasing with life expectancy: bND ≤ bND+1.
In harmony with Tables 1 and 2, we also assume the existence of a positive in-
teger D˜ such that for a life expectancy lower/higher than D˜, the estimation error is
negative/nonnegative:
SD < 0 if D ≤ D˜ and SD ≥ 0 if D > D˜. (A3)
Due to (6), the lifetime balances of the shorter/longer lived types are positive/nonpositive:
zND > 0 if D ≤ D˜ and zND ≤ 0 if D > D˜. (7)
Strengthening (A3), we may assume that the estimation error is also an increasing
fraction of the life expectancy. This assumption implies that the retirement age stays
away from the life expectancy, i.e. Rω ¿ ω. (For example, in the US, Rω = 70 years.)
Sα < · · · < SD˜ < 0 ≤ SD˜+1 < · · · < Sω. (A3∗)
We can now formulate
Theorem 1. a) Under A1–A3*, the lifetime balance zND of the longer lived types
(D > D˜) is nonpositive and decreasing with life expectancy D:
0 ≥ zN
D˜+1
> . . . > zNω−1 > z
N
ω . (8a)
b) If, in addition to a), the wages and the retirement ages are both type-invariant,
then the lifetime balance zND of a shorter lived type (D < D˜) is positive and decreasing
with life expectancy D:
zNα > · · · > zND˜−1 > zND˜ > 0. (8b)
Proof. a) Considering the longer lived, by A3*, the first factor of zND is negative
and decreasing; by A1–A2, the second factor is positive and increasing, therefore their
product is negative and decreasing.
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b) If wD and RD are age-invariant, then the benefit bND is also invariant, therefore
zND is proportional to SD, hence A3* implies (8b).
Remarks. (i) A3* trivially holds for the primitive approach (e.g. Eso˝ et al., 2011)
when SD = D − D∗, where D∗ is the average life expectancy. (ii) Also, A3* trivially
holds if the retirement age is type-invariant: RD ≡ R∗, when SD = D − R∗ −M(R∗).
(iii) Note that without assuming constant wages and retirement ages, (8b) is not true
in general (in (6), −SD > 0 would decrease, while bND > 0 still increases) but we will
return to it in Theorem 3.
Example 1. As a simple illustration, we consider the continuous (rather than dis-
crete) uniform lifespan distribution, where the distribution function is
F (x) =
x− α
ω − α, α ≤ x ≤ ω.
It is also assumed that the adult retirement age is a homogeneous linear function of the
adult life expectancy: R(D) ≡ ρD, where 1/2 < ρ < 1. Following Banya´r’s critique, we
assume that the earliest exit precedes the latest retirement: α < ρω. Then the average
life expectancy is
D∗ =
α+ ω
2
;
while the remaining life expectancy is
M(A) = D∗ −A if 0 ≤ A < α and M(A) = 1
2
(ω −A) if α < A ≤ ω.
Consequently, introducing the switching point DS = ρ−1α of M(A), the estimation
error is
S(D) = D−D∗ if α ≤ D ≤ DS and S(D) = 12[(2− ρ)D− ω] if DS < D ≤ ω.
Note that D˜ = D∗ and A3 as well as A3* holds.
We can now turn to the sign of the average balance:
z∗ =
ω∑
D=α
fD zD. (9)
To generalize our earlier result on the deficit in the NDC scheme (Theorem 3 of
Simonovits, 2003), we must look for a further sufficient condition. We propose the
following assumption; the earning-weighted average of the conditional estimation errors
is nonnegative:
s =
ω∑
D=α
fD SD wD ≥ 0. (A4)
In the original primitive model, where SD = D − D∗ and wD ≡ 1 hold, s = 0 also
holds. In the realistic model, however, if the earnings were constant (A2o) and the
lifespan distribution were uniform (Example 1), then A4 would not hold: s < 0. But we
shall see in Table 3 below that a slight rise in the wage–lifespan function would make
A4 valid. Anyway, for type-invariant retirement ages, A4 is not only a sufficient but a
necessary condition for z∗N ≤ 0. In summary, A4 seems to be satisfactory.
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Theorem 2. If A1–A4 hold, then the average NDC-balance is negative: z∗N < 0
except if the retirement age is type-invariant: RD ≡ R∗ and if s = 0 holds, then z∗N = 0.
Proof. Inserting zND s [(6)] into z
∗ [(9)] and using notation bND = b
N (RD) = βNDwD,
the NDC balance
z∗N = −
ω∑
D=α
fD SD wD β
N
D (10)
can be estimated from above. Note that the replacement rates
βND =
τRD
M(RD)
form a weakly increasing sequence. By A3, for D ≤ D˜, SD < 0 and for D > D˜, SD ≥ 0.
Cutting z∗N into two at D˜, the first subsum contains positive products, while the second
does negatives. Inequalities
βND ≤ βND˜ for D ≤ D˜ and βND ≥ βND˜ for D > D˜
and A4 imply
z∗N ≤ −
ω∑
D=α
fD β
N
D˜
SD wD = −βND˜
ω∑
D=α
fD SD wD ≤ 0.
If Rα < Rω (i.e. βNα < βNω ) or s > 0, then z∗N < 0.
Of course, the resulting deficit needs to be eliminated, i.e. by suitably reducing the
contribution rate τ to τˆ(< τ) in the corresponding balanced NDC-formula:
bˆN (RD) =
τˆRD wD
M(RD)
. (11)
Note that we neglected the unfavorable reaction of the adjustment on the retirement
ages.
At this point we must admit that our modeling of asymmetric information is still
inadequate: we assume that the government knows RD but does not know D. Similarly,
the incorporation of wage heterogeneity enables the government to infer D from wD.
The best justification for these inadequacies is as follows: in reality, there are shorter
lived types with lower labor disutility and longer lived ones with higher labor disutility
who retire at the same age. Similarly, those who die at age D may have different wages.
4. Regular benefit–retirement age schedules
We want to show that Theorem 1 can be generalized from constant wages and retire-
ment ages and the NDC scheme to variable wages and retirement ages and some other
schedules, called regular. This way we reformulate Eso˝ et al. (2011, Theorem 1) from
common to increasing earnings (in A2). Note that our critique of the NDC system is
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addressed not against redistribution per se but its excessive degree. For the time being,
we leave open whether the system is balanced or not. Before entering the discussion,
we present an (irregular) example without any redistribution.
Example 2. The case where there is no redistribution. Let the replacement rate be
type-invariant: bD = βwD (β > 0) and let the (adult) retirement age be proportional
to the (adult) life expectancy: RD ≡ ρD (1/2 < ρ < 1). For a balanced system (where
τρ = β(1− ρ)), each type’s lifetime balance is zero:
zD = τwDρD − βwD(1− ρ)D = 0, D = α, . . . , ω.
This rule, however, eliminates any incentives: it does not charge any deduction for early
retirement and does not pay any reward for later retirement.
We define now the concept of regular schedule (and drop superscript N) for (bD) by
additional assumptions A1* and A5.
The increase in the retirement age, ∆RD = RD+1−RD is nonnegative and less than
or equal to the ratio of the D’s benefit bD to the sum of the contribution τwD and the
same benefit:
0 ≤ ∆RD ≤ bD
τwD + bD
, D = α . . . , ω − 1. (A1∗)
We also assume that the difference quotient of the benefit to the contribution is at
least as large as the ratio of the next retirement age to the next actual pension span:
∆bD
τ∆wD
≥ RD+1
D + 1−RD+1 , D = α . . . , ω − 1. (A5)
The upper bound on ∆RD in A1* has no clear economic content but to help better
understanding, it is worth substituting the NDC benefits (2) into A1*. Indeed, A1*
becomes
∆RND ≤
RD
M(RD) +RD
< 1. (A1∗N)
Only the relaxation of (1*) into ∆RD < 1 is a natural requirement. Indeed, why
should type D + 1 work at least one year longer than type D just because he is going
to live one year longer?
A5 on the benefit–contribution difference quotient is even more difficult to interpret.
In Diamond (2003) and Eso˝ et al. (2011), the wages were type-independent, therefore
A5 was automatically satisfied. A5 only means that the type-dependent wage increases
much less with the life expectancy than the benefit does. For example, if RD ≡ ρD,
then A5 states that the difference quotient should be at least ρ/(1 − ρ) ≥ 1. For the
NDC benefits, A5 holds.
Theorem 3. a) Under A1*, A2 and A5, for any regular schedule, the lifetime
balance is a weakly decreasing sequence of the life expectancy:
zα ≥ · · · ≥ zD ≥ zD+1 ≥ · · · ≥ zω. (12)
b) If the system is balanced, then there exists an age Dˆ such that
zDˆ ≥ 0 ≥ zDˆ+1.
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Proof. a) Starting from zD+1 = (τwD+1 + bD+1)RD+1 − bD+1(D + 1), we shall
arrive to zD by increases. Introducing bD+1 = bD +∆bD and wD+1 = wD +∆wD,
zD+1 = [τ(wD +∆wD) + bD +∆bD]RD+1 − (bD +∆bD)(D + 1)
= (τwD + bD)RD+1 − bD(D + 1) + [τ∆wDRD+1 −∆bD(D + 1−RD+1)].
By A5, the third term in [ ] is negative or zero, therefore we can drop it. Introducing
also RD+1 = RD +∆RD, the difference between the first and the second terms can be
estimated by A1* as
zD+1 ≤ (τwD + bD)RD+1 − bD(D + 1) = zD + (τwD + bD)∆RD − bD ≤ zD.
b) Trivial.
At the end of the Section we discuss an alternative solution underlying the previous
approaches which neglected wage heterogeneity. This approach has the advantage over
the present one that it avoids the artificial restriction that wage is determined by life
expectancy. Let us assume that we have a discrete two-dimensional life-expectancy–
wage distribution gD,w and form the conditional life expectancy probability distribution
for a given w, whose probability is denoted by hw > 0:
fˆD|w =
gD,w
hw
.
In theory, we could separate the population into separate w-classes and solve the sched-
ule problem separately.
But no government has the necessary information on the two-dimensional fˆD|w for
fine enough resolution. Moreover, our technical assumption that wages do not change
during the working stage of the types would prevent any practical application.
5. Numerical illustrations
Different pension rules imply different retirement ages, and this should be taken into
account in the comparisons (cf. Eso˝ et al., 2011). Nevertheless, here we only display two
simple numerical examples, illustrating the balanced and the compressed NDC systems,
respectively without taking into account their impact on the choice of retirement ages.
We use the simplest analytical lifespan distribution function, namely the uniform
one in Example 1. We shall use α = 42 and ω = 72 years, omitting the 21 years of
childhood.8 (In other words, people die between ages 63 and 93 years.) Furthermore,
we assume a linear retirement age–adult lifespan function R ≡ 2D/3 and a linear wage–
adult lifespan function wD = wα + δ(D− α) such that the expected wage is equal to 1,
for wα = 0.9, implying δ = 0.0066.... We apply τ = 0.3.
We provide useful aggregate statistics on the balanced NDC scheme, denoting by E
the expectations: ED = 57 years, Ew = 1.00, ER = 38 years, Eb = 0.558, Ez = 0,
8 We changed the usual L = 20 to 21 to have numbers all divisible by 3.
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Dz = 4.8 and s = −0.007. (We have chosen the minimal wage wα so high that s ≥ 0
A4 just holds.) To eliminate the deficit, the benefits were proportionally reduced by
18.7 percent by choosing τˆ = 0.244 in (11).) The size of the corresponding standard
deviation can only be judged by comparison to the second simulation.
The first column of Table 3 displays the life expectancies. The next two columns
provide the type-specific benefits and balances for the balanced NDC scheme, respec-
tively. Note that the shortest lived’s annual benefit is quite low: about 34 percent of
the lowest net wage, while the longest lived’s annual benefit is quite high: about 140
percent of the highest net wage. The lifetime balances are decreasing, starting from
higher than 5.1 years own wage and ending with lower than –9.1 years own wage.
Turning to the compressed NDC scheme, we dampen the incentives of original NDC
benefit function by taking only its power θ, where 0 < θ < 1 and multiply it by an
appropriate constant (b∗)1−θ (Simonovits, 2003):
bD = (bND)
θ(b∗)1−θ, (13)
where θ = 0.5 and b∗ = 0.527, making the expected lifetime balance zero. We renounce
the discussion of the incentive effect on retirement ages.
The aggregate statistics of the compressed NDC scheme are as follows: ER = 38
years, Eb = 0.501, Ez = 0.05 and Dz = 2.166. The size of the corresponding standard
deviation is only 45% of the balanced one, a great improvement.
Table 3. Outcomes for original and compressed NDC schemes
Adult
life Balanced Lifetime Compressed Lifetime
expectancy N-benefit N-balance M-benefit M-balance [year]
D bˆND zˆ
N
D b
M
D z
M
D
42 0.212 4.579 0.371 2.371
45 0.250 4.523 0.402 2.250
48 0.295 4.307 0.436 2.046
51 0.348 3.881 0.474 1.740
54 0.412 3.175 0.515 1.307
57 0.490 2.090 0.562 0.716
60 0.588 0.480 0.616 –0.080
63 0.713 –1.878 0.679 –1.145
66 0.816 –3.964 0.726 –1.974
69 0.936 –9.964 0.777 –2.974
72 1.078 –10.032 0.834 –4.177
Remark. bˆND from (11) and b
M
D from (13). Except for column 1, the date are given
in terms of the average wage.
The last two columns of Table 3 display the type-specific benefits and lifetime bal-
ances of the compressed run. Note that the shortest lived’s annual benefit is quite low
but higher than originally: about 59 percent of the lowest net wage, while the longest
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lived’s annual benefits are quite high but much less than before: about 108 percent of
the highest net wage. The lifetime balances are still decreasing but much more com-
pressed, starting from 2.6 years surplus and ending with 3.8 years deficit, all expressed
in the type-specific wages.
At the end we note that using a more realistic life expectancy distribution function
(with a hump-shaped rather than a constant density function), probably the distortion
would be less but not negligible. The replacement of proportional retirement ages by a
more concentrated schedule would also reduce the distortion.
6. Conclusions
The NDC scheme is basically a reasonable pension system, achieving an automatic
rewarding/punishing of late/early retirement. Nevertheless, it neglects the impact of
the life expectancy on the choice of retirement age and the strong positive correlation
between life expectancy and (lifetime average) wage. Therefore this system achieves a
too strong regressive redistribution from the expectedly shorter lived and worse paid
workers to the expected longer lived and better paid ones. We showed that qualitatively
similar redistribution occurs for all regular (and other) schemes but its size can be made
much smaller.
In the international arena, there were or there are various types of interactions
among progressivity and rewards/punishments. On the one hand, there were pension
systems (like in Germany until 1992), where the benefit was proportional to individ-
ual lifetime contributions but there was hardly any reward/punishment. On the other
hand, there are pension systems (like in the US), where the benefit is a strongly concave
function of the lifetime contribution, but there is strong reward/punishment for delay-
ing/forwarding retirement. Taking into account gender differences makes the problem
even more difficult. As an anonymous referee remarked on the NDC, while there is a re-
distribution from the poor males to the rich males through the reward, there is another
redistribution from the rich males to the poor females through the progressivity.
Further research with calibrated data is needed to determine the socially optimal
modification of the NDC system via mechanism design. Anyway, much caution is needed
to use the NDC scheme, even if means-testing or pension credit softens its impact.
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